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Abstract— Covert channels have the unique quality of masking
evidence that a communication has ever occurred between two
parties. For spies and terrorist cells, this quality can be the
difference between life and death. However, even the detection
of communications in a botnet could be troublesome for its
creators. To evade detection and prevent insights into the size
and members of a botnet, covert channels can be used. A
botnet should rely on covert channels built on ubiquitous
protocols to blend in with legitimate traffic. In this paper, we
propose a covert channel built on the BitTorrent peer-to-peer
protocol. In a simple application, this covert channel can be
used to discretely and covertly send messages between two
parties. However, this covert channel can also be used to
stealthily distribute commands or the location of a command
and control server for use in a botnet.
Keywords: Computer Security; Covert Channels; BitTorrent;
Botnets; Information Hiding

I.

INTRODUCTION

Cryptography is useful in providing message
confidentiality, or preventing a third party from uncovering
the content of a message. However, cryptography is not
designed to hide evidence that the communication has
occurred. For some applications, even the existence of a
communication between two parties could have disastrous
consequences. These applications must rely on covert
channels to prevent a third party from uncovering evidence
that a communication has occurred. The term “covert
channels” was first coined by Lampson nearly 30 years ago
[1]. These original covert channels operated on a single
machine to send information from a high security level
process to that of a low security level process. Today, the
majority of computing devices are attached to a network.
Network protocols can be used to create covert channels
were messages can be sent to remote machines in a stealthy
manner [2]. In most cases, covert channels make use of
unintended characteristics of network protocols that can be
used to store information. The number of network protocols
and their complexities allows for the creation of an almost
unlimited number of covert channels.
Botnets are one possible application for covert channels.
Botnets are groups of compromised machines that attackers
control remotely for a variety of mostly malicious purposes.
This includes conducting distributed denial of service
attacks, sending spam messages, stealing account
information, and conducting identity theft. Traditional
botnets were controlled from an IRC server where the
attackers could send commands to nodes of the botnet.
However, this method is rarely used today as it presents a

single point of failure for the botnet and they are more easily
dismantled. As a result, malware writers have tried to devise
better ways to control their army of compromised machines.
Command and control over HTTP or HTTPS is common
nowadays due to the prevalence of these protocols on the
Internet. This makes identifying botnet traffic on the network
more difficult. However, locating the command and control
server is still a common failure point for botnets. For
example, if they have static domain addresses programmed
into the malware these can be null-routed and the botnet will
go offline. This has led some malware writers to rely on
DNS generation algorithms where DNS names are generated
in a pseudo-random fashion. While these are more difficult
to take down, it is not impossible. Another even more
resilient method for botnet command and control relies on
peer-to-peer network protocols [3]. This design completely
decentralizes the botnet and makes it very difficult for
defenders to track and dismantle. Malware authors will
continue to explore resilient and stealthy methods to control
botnets. Utilizing covert channels are another method that
botnets use to elude detection from security researchers.
BitTorrent is one example of a peer-to-peer protocol. In
recent years it has exploded in popularity and is responsible
for the majority of the Internet traffic in most regions of the
world [4]. The high volume and common use of the
BitTorrent protocol would make an ideal target for malware
writers that wish to blend in with legitimate traffic. Also,
most BitTorrent networks are open and require no
authentication. Therefore, a covert channel in the BitTorrent
protocol would be an ideal candidate for covert channels,
especially in the case of botnets.
II.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Much research has been done developing new types of
covert channels [2]. Some of these covert channels rely on
the TCP protocol to hide information. For example, Rowland
proposed hiding messages in the Initial Sequence Number
(ISN) field of a TCP SYN packet [5]. This sequence number
is used to synchronize TCP packets in a communication and
is normally randomly generated for the first packet of a TCP
connection. However, a covert message can be inserted into
the ISN field instead before being sent to the receiver. Other
covert channels utilize the DNS protocol to send hidden
information. In one such channel, information is sent over
DNS lookup requests to a fake DNS server [2]. The message
is encoded in the hostname field of the lookup request.
Research has also been done on categorizing types of
covert channels and evaluating them based on common

criteria. These criteria include the type, throughput,
robustness, and probability of detection [6]. The most
common types of covert channels are storage, timing, and
behavioral based. The covert channel proposed in this paper
can be considered a storage channel. Throughput measures
the amount of information that can be sent over a given time
interval. Covert channels can range from very low
throughput rates of less than 10 bits per hour to high rates of
megabytes per second. The robustness measures how
resilient the covert channel as it proceeds through
networking devices or other layers in the networking stack.
Finally, detection measures how susceptible the covert
channel is to detection from active listeners along the data
path. Usually these criteria conflict with each other and a
designer must select the most appropriate qualities for a
given application. For example, generally as the throughput
increases a covert channel’s probability of being detected
also increases.
The use of covert channels in botnet networks is not new.
Johnson, Bo, and Lutz stated that malware authors might
begin utilizing covert channels as a means to evade detection
[7]. Also, Butler et al. proposed using a covert channel in
DNS as a method for botnet command and control [8].
However, no published paper has documented the use of the
BitTorrent network protocol directly. On the other hand, Li
et al. proposed using torrent files to store covert messages
[9]. Torrent files contain all of the necessary information
needed to download a certain file, or collection of files, using
the BitTorrent protocol.
III.

COVERT CHANNEL IN BITTORRENT

A. Background
BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer protocol used for file
sharing. Each user downloading a file also simultaneous
uploads pieces that they have already received to other
users. BitTorrent trackers are used so peers can locate other
users that are downloading the same file. Users that are
actively downloading files are known as leechers, while
users that have completed downloading a file but remain
uploading to other users are known as seeders. The
BitTorrent tracker protocol operates over HTTP. Each
torrent uses a unique SHA1 hash to identify the files or
group of files that can be downloaded. After a user
downloads and opens a torrent file, their BitTorrent Client
will perform a GET request to the tracker. This GET request
contains the info hash (unique SHA1) from the torrent file,
the peer id of the client, an IP and port number of the client,
an event message, a numwant field, among others [10]. At
the start of the download the event message is “started.” The
peer id field is 20 bytes of randomly generated characters
unique to each client. The numwant field is the number of
peers the client wishes to receive. Figure 1 shows an
example announce request to torrent.ubuntu.com. As you
can see, the info_hash and peer_id fields are URL encoded.

Figure 1. Example announce request

The tracker will respond to the client’s request in a
standard HTTP format. Figure 2 shows the packet header of
the tracker response. Typically, trackers will return a
maximum of 50 peers per request. Trackers will respond
with a list of peers that are currently seeding or leeching the
requested file. If more peers are present than the amount
requested, peers are selected by the tracker randomly. This
response can be in two formats. Some trackers allow the
client to choose the response type, while others force a
specific response. The first response format is known as a
dictionary response. In a dictionary response, the server
sends a list of IP, port, and peer ids of clients currently
seeding or leeching the file. This response is structured in
the Bencode format and contains the IP and port numbers in
decimal notation. Figure 2 shows an example dictionary
response from the BackTrack Linux tracker. The second
response type is known as a binary or compact response. In
a binary response, the server will respond with a list of IP
and port numbers corresponding with other peers
in
network (big endian) notation. This response is typically the
default as it requires less bandwidth and is also encoded
with Bencode. Figure 3 shows a binary response from the
BackTrack Linux tracker. As you can see from the figure,
the response is not human readable. Peers are listed in the
response with 4 bytes for their IP address and 2 bytes for
their port number. No delimiter separates each IP/port
combination in the list. The binary response omits the peer
ID field entirely.

Figure 2. Tracker response header

Figure 3. Tracker dictionary response

Figure 4. Tracker binary response

B. Proposed Covert Channel
To covertly send messages using BitTorrent trackers, a
client could hide information in the peer id field during an
announce request. To receive the message, one could contact
the same tracker with the same info hash used as the sender
and perform another announce request. The target info hash
and tracker must be established prior to sending/receiving the
message. The receiver’s request would need to specify a
dictionary type response. The server will respond with peers
downloading the file which will include the peer ID of the
sender containing the covert message. Figure 2 shows an
example topology for this situation. The sender connects to
the tracker’s web interface and sends an announce request
with a peer id containing a covert message. This message is
then stored in the tracker’s database. To retrieve this
message, the receiver performs an announce request to the
tracker in the same fashion as legitimate P2P clients. The
server replies to the receiver with a list of clients active in the
specified torrent. This reply will contain the covert message.
In this covert channel, 20 bytes of information can be sent at
a time. However, for a more legitimate looking covert
channel, this could be reduced to 12 bytes. Most BitTorrent
clients reserve a portion of the peer id field for an identifier
of the client name and version number. For example, the
uTorrent client begins its peer id with the string “-UT3130-“
where 3130 corresponds with version 3.1.3 [11]. The
remaining 12 bytes are randomly chosen characters.
Unfortunately, many trackers do not support the
dictionary response format and therefore the peer id field
will not be visible to the receiver. An alternative covert
channel could utilize the IP field to send messages. The
BitTorrent protocol allows clients to specify IPs other than
that which the tracker sees in the connection. This feature
allows clients to connect to the tracker through proxy
servers or from the same side of a NAT device. An IPv4
address is 4 bytes which allows 4 bytes of information to be
stored in each announce request. For messages longer than 4
bytes, the message can be split across multiple requests to
the tracker. For each request, the peer id field must be
different. Otherwise, previous bytes will be overwritten in
the tracker’s database. The port field could be used as a
sequence number for each message so the receiver can
properly reorder the message chunks upon receipt. In order
for the message receiver to differentiate between valid peer
IP addresses or pieces of a covert message an XOR scheme
was used to encode messages. The receiver could simply
reverse the encoding mechanism and verify if the resulting
message was composed purely of ASCII characters.
However, this requires the original message only contains
ASCII characters.

Figure 5. BitTorrent tracker topology

In an implementation of the covert channel using the IP
field, we achieved a throughput rate of 20 bytes/second. A
higher rate was obtained with the peer id field due to it
allowing 5 times as many bytes than the IP field. Also, the
peer id field covert channel has a higher degree of
covertness. Hiding encrypted messages in the peer ID field
would be impossible to distinguish from normal peer IDs
due to their random nature. However, hiding messages in
the IP field could be detected as these would resolve to IPs
that are not actively participating in the download.
Fortunately, most torrents will contain peers that cannot be
contacted due to firewalls or peers that have closed their
download client. We collected data across several popular
ubuntu torrents to confirm this theory. Out of 1654 peers
reported by the tracker, only 1517 could be contacted
(91.7%). Additionally, some trackers are known to mix
random IPs into their tracker responses to provide plausible
deniability in file sharing lawsuits [12].
IV.

DISCUSSION

We created proof of concept code to test the validity of
the proposed covert channels. In both cases, we were
successful in sending messages over the proposed covert
channels. The backtrack-linux.org tracker supports the
dictionary response and was used to send messages over the
peer id field. To send messages over the IP and port field, the
tracker from etree.org was used. An interesting issue
occurred if more than 50 peers were downloading the target
file. It could not be guaranteed that the receiver would see
the sender’s message with a single request. As a result,
multiple requests were made to the server until the message
was received. The selection of which torrent to rendezvous at
is important for this reason. If the torrent has too many
seeders and leechers then the message receiver is required to
perform many requests to locate the message. However, if
the torrent has too few seeders and leechers then plausible
deniability is decreased. For most applications of this covert
channel, I would expect a low number of total peers (<30) to
be ideal. Also, torrents of copyrighted material would be less
than ideal due to the higher possibility of monitoring (From
the MPAA or other organizations).
The tracker will provide a min update interval to the
client as part of an announce request. This is the minimum
amount of time a client should wait before performing
another announce request. Typically, trackers will remove
clients that have not announced for twice the min update
interval. As a result, the messages need to be reposted within

this time frame to ensure they remain on the tracker. Typical
min update intervals are 1 hour.
Both of these covert channels could be used in botnets.
The BitTorrent trackers could be used as a rendezvous point
for botnet clients and their controller. As an alternative to a
domain name used to locate the IP of a command and control
server, the IP address could send in the covert channel. This
method would be more resilient to takedown than a domain
name. One possible weakness that could be exploited to
enumerate all nodes of the botnet would be to send the IP
address of a monitoring server to the target tracker. This
would be possible to anyone who knows the rendezvous
locations and algorithm. To prevent insights into the size of
the botnet and to prevent a possible hijack, public key
cryptography could be used to sign the IP address.
Unfortunately, utilizing 1024 bit RSA key would require
almost as many bits for message signing and would be much
too large for the covert channel. Elliptical curve
cryptography (ECC) has the advantage of having an
equivalent level of security with much smaller key sizes. For
example, ECC with a 160 bit key offers the same level of
security as RSA with 1024 bits [13]. Starnberger, Kruegel,
and Kirda proposed using ECC in their botnet protocol with
a 112 bit key [13]. This allows for 40 bit messages to be
securely sent if a maximum cipher text length of 20 bytes is
desired. Thus, a botnet controller could encode the command
and control server using a single message in the peer id
covert channel.
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